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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD E. HULBERT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
. - vs- Case No • 
16197 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
There are some basic errors in Respondent's analysis 
of this case and the law applicable thereto as reflected in 
his brief. It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to 
point these out to the court in order that the issues herewith 
presented may be fully analyzed and more fairly determined. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
TO HEAR THIS CASE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH 
EXCEPT AS TO THE MANNER IN WHICH HIS 
CLAIM WAS FILED. 
- l-
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The respondent asserts that the statute under 
which he sought relief in this case was governed by all 
the proc-:dures of the Governmental Immunity Act which he 
atteges supersedes the constitutional power of the Board 
of Examiners to hear and determine his claim by vesting 
such jurisdiction in the district courts. (See pages 
10-14 of respondent's brief.) Section 63-30a-3, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted specially for the benefit 
of the respondent as a result of his lobbying efforts in 
1977, provides as follows: 
This act shall apply to claims 
arising prior to the effect1ve date 
of this act so long as those claims 
are filed in the manner provided in 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
and within two years after the cause 
of action arises. (Emphasis added.) 
The foregoing statute contains the only reference in Chapter 
30a to the Governmental Immunity Act and there is no ambi-
guity cr uncertainty as to its provisions requiring retroactive 
claims to be filed in accordance with that act. Recognizing 
this fact the respondent has resourcefully resorted to the 
title of the act (Chapter 245, Laws of Utah 1977) to support 
his thesis. That title is as follows: 
An act relating to governmental 
affairs; providing for the reimburse-
ment to officers and employees of the 
state for legal fees and costs necess-
arily incurred in the successful defense 
of grand jury indictments; defining 
terms; and providing that the act shall 
apply to all cla1ms subr;-,itted within 
-2-
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the time limits and in the manner pro-
vided in the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. (Emphasis Added.) 
Thus the respondent would supplant the substantive and 11•1ted 
provisions of the act with the descriptive and general ter•s 
set forth in the title of the act. No support in American 
and English jurisprudence can be cited for such a principle. 
The universal rule is set forth as follows in 73 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Statutes, 198: 
The rule which permits reading the 
title of an act in aid of statutory con-
struction applies only in cases where 
the legislative meaning is left in 
doubt by failure to clearly express it 
in the law. Moreover, the ambiguit~ 
which justifies a resort to the tit e 
must arise in the body of the actj an 
ambiguity arising from the title 1s not 
sufficient. Thus where the punctuation 
in the body of the act conforms to the 
intent otherwise disclosed therein, a 
different punctuation of corresponding 
language in the title is· of no consequence. 
Similarly the use of a singular number in 
the title is not persuasive against the 
application of the plural to the same 
subject matter in accordance with the 
words of the act. The title cannot be 
resorted to for the purpose of restrict-
ing or enlarging the scope of a positive 
and explicit clause in the body of the 
~or setting at naught the obvious 
meaning thereof. The title of an act 
cannot limit the plain meaning of the 
text. Indeed, resort to the title of 
a statute as an aid in the interpreta-
tion thereof has even been declared 
to be an unsafe criterion, and entitled 
to little weight, although this state-
ment authorities as a whole warrant. 
The title is not conclusive in regard 
to the meaning of a statute. 
- 3-
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And, with respect to constitutional provisions such as our 
own (Article VI, Section 22, Utah Constitution, as amended 
tn 1972 to include the matter formerly contained in Section 
23 of said Article pertaining to the subject of a bill being 
clearly expressed in the title) it is stated as follows in 
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, §99: 
With regard to a constitutional 
provision requiring the subject or ob-
ject of a statute to be expressed in its 
ti~le, it has been said that the effect 
thereof is to render a title indispensable. 
Although the courts do regard the rule 
which eermits the consideration of the 
title 1n cases where an enactment is 
susceetible of diverse construction, as 
eseecully applicable, where the con-
Stltutional provision under consideration 
is in effect, the courts do not, as a 
whole, go further than this. 
In the case at bar there is no ambiguity, uncertainty 
or lack of plain meaning in the s,tatute involved (Section 
63-30a-3) which renders it susceptible of diverse construction. 
It is a clear and unambiquous statement of the manner in wh~ch 
retroactive claims, such as the respondent's, are to be filed 
and makes no provision whatsoever for the application of the 
Governmental Immunity Act otherwise to claims arising under 
that statute. Under the foregoing legal principles it is 
absolutely clear tnat the title to the act in question cannot 
be incorporated as the substantive law in lieu of the unam-
t>iguous provisions of the statute itself. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE DECREE 
AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT "AGREEMENT" BETWEEN RESPONDENT 
AND HIS ATTORNEYS, IF ANY, IS INVALID. 
The respondent relies heavily upon the case of Oliver 
v. Mitchell, 14 U.2d 9, 376 P.2d 390 (1962) as support for the 
lower court's finding that the respondent and his counsel 
agreed that he would pay reasonable attorneys fees if and when 
he obtained the means and that the passage of the statute here 
involved provided him with such means and he thereby "incurred• 
reasonable attorneys fees of $61,820.00 at the expense of Utah 
taxpayers. In the Oliver case the plaintiff sought recovery 
of attorney's fees for defending one Mitchell on a first-
degree murder charge even though the plaintiff had been 
appointed by the court to do so at a time when no public com-
pensation was provided for the defense of impecunious persons 
charged with crime. The lower court found that a contract 
existed whereby Oliver was to represent Mitchell for a fee 
of $5,000 and awarded judgment to the plaintiff for $2,500 
plus interest and costs which he sought to recover from 
insurance moneys received in prison by Mitchell as beneficiary 
of nis brother who was accidentally killed in military service. 
- 5-
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The holding of this court. was that indigents are as legally 
competent to contract as other men and the attorney was 
entitled to recover his fee although the judgment was 
limited to half of the fee agreed upon. 
The respondent claims that there is no distinguish-
able difference between the Oliver case and this action. 
(Page 18 of Respondent's brief.) First of all, that action 
was predicated upon a contract for a fixed sum payable by 
the client himself and not by the body politic through 
legislative lobbying efforts. Secondly, the action was 
brought by the attorney himself to recover a fee due and· 
owing to him under contract. Third, the judgment awarded 
to the attorney was less than the fee which the court found 
the parties had agreed upon. Fourth, the attorney was 
appointed as an officer of the court to defend his indigent 
client in a first-degree murder case which did not preclude 
an agreement for the payment of his services. Fifth, the 
agreement between the parties was not subsequently changed 
to increase the attorney's compensation. Sixth, the obligation 
of the client was fixed by agreement and not by a statute 
limiting the recovery of attorneys fees to those which are 
"reasonable" and "necessarily incurred". Eighth, the attorney, 
and not the client, was the person benefitted by the judgment. 
Ninth, a real controversy and adversary proceeding existed 
between the attorney and his client with respect to the fee 
-6-
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payable for the attorney's services. Tenth, the ability 
of the client to pay was measured by his own resources and 
not by those of the State of Utah. It is difficult to 
understand how counsel for the respondent could find no 
distinguishable differences between the case at bar and 
the Oliver case in which Mr. Wayne Black, the ostensible 
beneficiary of the lower court's judgment in the instant 
case, was counsel for Mr. Oliver. 
The ultimate question to be resolved in this case 
is the amount of the "reasonable attorney~' fees and court 
costs necessarily incurred" by the respondent in the defense 
of the indictments issued against him pursuant to Section 
63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted in 1977. 
It is undisputed that the respondent's attorneys agreed fn 
writing to accept $18,500 as their total fee for services 
rendered by letter dated September 3, 1976. {Exhibit 4-P.) 
That such fee was approved and accepted by the respondent 
is clearly established by his subsequent written statements. 
His immediate response to the foregoing letter from his 
attorneys was a note dated September 10, 1976, in which he 
acknowledged receiving their "bill", expressed his grateful-
ness "for all you have done" and stated his realization that 
"the fee you have charged me is very, very minimal" (Emphasis 
added), and then declared that "(m)y only concern is making 
prompt payment to you." (Exhibit 5-P.) And then as late as 
-7-
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September 9, 1977, in a letter to his attorneys (Exhibit 1-D) 
ht stated: 
• Dea r M r • B 1a c k : 
You have indicated that Mr. Joseph 
McCarthy. Deputy Attorney General, has 
suggested I write you a letter regarding 
our final understanding with regard to 
the attorneys fee in connection with my 
i nd1 ctmen ts. 
My best recollection is that in early 
October of 1976 I was in your office and 
discussed this matter with you. At that 
time, I had paid a total of $8,500 on the 
fee. You indicated to me at that t1me 
you thought there was an excellent chance 
the remaining indictments would be dis-
missed and that you realized I had been 
through a hard financial time. You said 
if I paid an additional $10,000 or a 
total of $18,500.00, I could consider 
the attorneys fee paid in full and that 
I could have as much time as I needed 
to make the payment. I said T realiz~d 
that this amount would nowhere near pay 
you and your firm for all you had done 
for me, and I told you how grateful I 
was for your help and friendship. 
I am sure that a day or two after 
our conversation you sent me a letter 
confirming the above fee arrangement. 
My best recollection is that I received 
the letter shortly before October 8, 1976. 
I relate to this date because on said 
date I again came to your office and paid 
an additional £2,000.00. I believe that 
I returned the letter signed approved to 
your office. 
At your request, I have searched 
my personal effects in the event a copy 
of the letter might be among tnem, and 
I cannot find a copy. I am not really 
sure whether you sent me an extra copy. 
- S-
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I made one additional payment of 
$1,000 on the fee, bringing the total 
payments I have made to date up to' 
$11 ,500.00. 
Yours sincerely, 
/s/ Gerald E. Hulbert 
Gerald E. Hulbert 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, at least a full year after receiving the bfll 
in letter form from his attorneys, the respondent acknowledged 
the fee arrangement contained therein and stated that he had 
returned the letter "signed approved" to his attorney's office. 
The absence of that original letter as an evidentiary exhfbft 
in this case is of singular interest. Certainly the letter 
containing the only bill ever submitted by the attorneys in 
this case to their client and its return with the client's 
approval of a fee amounting to $lt,SOO would constitute an 
important document to the respondent and his attorneys in 
this case. Such letter was in the exclusive possession 
of the respondent or his attorneys and its introduction in 
evidence would have been extremely damaging to the plaintiff's 
case if it did contain the approval of the fee arrangement 
by the respondent. A £.Q.Q.Y_ of that letter before jts return 
with the express approval of the respondent is all that is 
contained in the record of this case. See Exhibit 4-P. 
However, we have the respondent's unambigious admission in 
Exhibit 1-D (introduced by the defendant, not the plaintiff, 
in the court oelow) that he had indeed approved of the bill 
-9-
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and fee arrangement submitted to him by his attorneys. This 
court has recognized that in judging credibility of witnesses 
1t is usually assumeo that a person is more likely to be 
telling ~he truth with respect to matters adverse to his 
own interests than where it may benefit him. Cannon v. WrighlL 
531 P.2d 1290 (Utah, 1975). 
From the foregoing it is absolutely clear that the 
•reasonable' attorneys' fees "necessarily incurred" by the 
respondent in the defense of the grand jury indictments against 
him cannot exceed the agreed-upon amount of $18,500 •. The 
judgment of the lower court was not based upon the undisputed 
written documentation in evidence, the credibility of which 
is certainly superior to the self-serving statements of the 
respondent and his beneficiary attorney upon which the trial 
judge concluded that "the plaintiff intended his obligation 
to be one for reasonable fees at a then undetermined level" 
and that Mr. Black "apparently intended that obligation to 
be contingent upon plaintiff's future ability to pay, if any." 
(See memorandum decision, R. 98-99, quoted at pages 15-16 of 
respondent's brief.) As stated before, it this court re-
cognizes the dual-fee standard espoused by the respondent--one 
fee based upon the i ndi vi dual's abi 1 i ty to pay when he is found 
guilty under the indictments, the other based upon the state's 
ability to pay when he is found not guilty--the mischief 
that could result from defense counsels' efforts to guarantee 
themselves a sweepstakes prize in the event of success would~' 
- 1 0-
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inimical to the ends of justice. The bribing of _jurors or 
witnesses by attorneys in litigation is not an anheard-of 
matter and certainly should not be encouraged by the courts 
in this day of increasing disregard of perjury laws, ethics 
standards and the criminal law in general by persons of all 
walks of life who weigh their own guilt in monetary sc .. s 
only in terms of the risk of being caught. 
In an apparent effort to overcome the prior hold-
ings of this court in Skeen v. Peterson, 113 U. 483, 196 P.2d 
708, and Ashton v. Skeen, 85 U. 489, 39 P.2d 1072, pointed out 
at pages 42-45 of appellant's brief on appeal, that contracts 
between attorney and client whereby the former's compensation 
is increased after the attorney-client relationship is 
established are presumptively invalid, the respondent cites 
the case of Rudd v. Crown International, 26 U.2d 263, 488 P.2d 
298 {1971) involving the recovery of attorney's fees pursuant 
to contract. The entire statement of the court on that matter 
is as follows, at pages 301-302 of the P.2d Reporter: 
Finally, defendant challenges the 
reasonableness of the sum of $10,000, 
as found by the trial court in the 
award of attorney's fees. The evidence 
as testified to by the plaintiff indi-
cates that plaintiffs counsel originally 
agreed to work for $35 per hour; as the 
action progressed, and the motions and 
hearings multiplied, the fee was raised 
to ~s.ooo and ultimately to $10,000. 
Defendant claims that counsel is limited 
to ~35 per hour and that there was no 
evidence as to the exact number of 
hours so devoted; and, therefore, there 
- ll-
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is insufficient evidence to support 
the sum aw~rded. Th~s argument is 
without merit. 
* * *The question of 
what is a reasonable attorney's 
fee in a contested matter is 
not necessarily controlled by 
any set formula. What is reason-
able depends upon a number of 
factors, the amount in controversy, 
the extent of services rendered 
and other factors which the trial 
court is in an advantaged position 
to judge. (Quoting from Wallace 
v. Build, Inc., 16 U.2d 401, 405, 
402 P.2d 699) 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed; costs are awarded to plaintiff. 
It is clear from the foregoing that the court's rulincl 
was limited solely to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustairl 
the award and did not address the underlying question as to 
the validity of subsequent agreements whereby an attorney's 
fees are increased from those ori~inally agreed upon. It 
cannot be determined from the facts stated in the Rudd case 
whether the attorney's fee awarded actually exceeded that 
originally contracted by the parties. All that can be said 
for the above ruling is that there may be some cases in which 
an increase in an attorney's fee from that originally contractE 
may be justified. It certainly does not stand for the pro-
position that an increase in an attorney's compensation is 
valid under all circumstances, and the circumstances of this 
case fall squarely within the pronit:>ition of the Skeen v. 
Peterson and Ash ton v . 5 k e en c a s e s . s u c' r a , p a r t i c u l a r 1 '• 11 n ere 
1 ~ 
- I ..,: -
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the "agreement" entered into subsequent to the original attor-
ney-client fee relationship increases the attorney's compensation 
by 3 l/2 times at the "understood" expense of the hapless public 
rather than the client himself. If is interesting to note that 
the respondent has not even mentioned the ~ and Ashton cases 
in his brief on appeal although they were prominently featured 
in aP,pellant's POINT II, at pages 42-45, to which the court 
is referred to avoid repetition. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY EN-
TITLED TO AN APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT AND THE 
ISSUES RAISED HEREIN ARE NOT MOOT. 
Under POINT IV of respondent's brief it is claimed 
that this appeal presents no jus~iciable claim and the issues 
raised are moot. The chronology of events leading to the re-
spondent's efforts to avoid the appeal of the State of Utah 
in this case is an interesting study in leap-frogging from 
one branch of state government to another and back again 
with great resourcefulness but little regard for the doctrine 
of separation of powers. This process may be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Following the successful defense of several 
indictments consisting of twelve criminal courts arising from 
tne respondent's activities as Chairman and Director of the 
- 1 3-
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Utah State Liquor Control Commission, the respondent personally 
lobbied a bill through a receptive legislature in 1977 author-
izing the retroactive recovery of the "reasonable attorney's 
fees and "court costs necessarily incurred" by the respondent 
therein. 
2. The respondent thereupon filed a claim with the 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor/Secretary of State and Attorney 
General (who collectively constitute the Board of Examiners of 
the State of Utah) although the respondent was only required 
to file the claim with the Attorney General in compliance with 
the Governmental Immunity Act (§63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended) as provided in the retroactive provision of 
the statute setting forth the manner in which such claims 
were to be filed (S63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended). 
3. The respondent then filed his action against the 
State of Utah following the 90-day period as provided in the 
Governmental Immunity Act without the Board of Examiners of 
the State of Utah ever having considered his claim. 
4. After successfully convincing the lower court 
that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, against the strong 
opposition of the appellant, the respondent obtained a judgment 
of $62,384.99 from which the appellant has appealed to this 
court on several grounds, including the jurisdiction of the 
lower court. 
- l .: -
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5. The respondent then sought relief fro• the Board 
of Examiners of the State of Utah in the a•ount of his judg•ent 
which was then being appealed by the State of Utah. The 
Board of Examiners, by a 2-1 vote, determined that no act1on 
should be taken upon his claim until the Supreme Court of 
Utah had rendered a decision on the appeal from the district 
court decision and specifically requested that the state 
legislature take no action until the appeal was resolved. 
(See Exhibits "A" and "B" attached to appellant's prior 
Memorandum in Response to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Oral 
Argument by Counsel for Respondent.) 
6. Not wishing to have the appea1 heard by this 
court in an action which he himself had engineered from the 
beginning, the respondent then went directly to the 1979 
legislature offering to accept $50,000 in satisfaction of his 
district court judgment if the legislature would appropriate 
that sum for payment to him. The legislature, disregarding 
the appeal in which the brief of the State of Utah had already 
been filed and the foregoing recommendation of the Board of 
Examiners, approved payment to the respondent of $50,000 in 
the 1979 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.B. No. 426). 
Even if we assume that the lower court had jurisdiction 
to reduce the unliquidated claim of the respondent to judgment, 
a position which the appellant has opposed from the commencement 
of this action, the question is raised as to the appellant's 
- l 5-
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right of review by appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to 
Art1cle Vlll, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution which provides: 
From all final judgments of the district 
court , there s h a 11 be a r i g h t of a p pea 1 to 
the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon 
the record made in the court below and under 
such regulations as may be provided by law. 
* * * 
The respondent asserts that the appropriation of the $50,000 
by the legislature renders the case moot and the appeal thereof 
subject to dismissal. In order to make such assertion he claims 
that the Board of Examiners did exercise its constitutional 
power under Article VIII, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution, 
by considering and acting upon the respondent's claim prior 
to legislative action thereon. Such claim is clearly erroneous 
in light of the minutes of the Board of Examiners meeting on 
November 29, 1978, and letter to the Claims Committee of the 
1979 Utah Legislature from the Bo'ard of Examiners dated March 1, 
1979, which are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" to appellant's 
prior Memeorandum in Response to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and 
Oral Argument by Counsel for Respondent and are also attached 
to Mr. Brant Wall's letter dated April 2, 1979, to Chief JustHe 
Crockett. The only action taken by the Board of Examiners 
upon the respondent's clai~ was to defer action thereon until 
such time as the Supreme Court had rendered a final decision 
on the appeal from tile district court. It i<o tnerefore evide"· 
that the Legislature totall_, d1s1·ecarded the const1tut1onal 
powers of the 6oaro of t\a"•-.ers. :>e ·:rE fu'i_. se~ fcr:r 
- ' t -
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in Point I of the appellant's brief on appeal. and then 
arrogated to itself the right of appellate review vested 
exclusively in the Supreme Court. Thus. if this appeal is 
dismissed as moot, the legislature, with the active par-
ticipation and initiative of the respondent, will have: 
(1) denied the executive branch of the State of Utah (the 
Board of Examiners) its constitutional right to consider 
and act upon claims of this sort; (2) pre-empted this court 
in the exercise of its appellate powers in a case initiated 
by the respondent himself; and (3) denied to the taxpayers 
of the State of Utah the right to have a substantial judgment 
against the State of Utah reviewed in the Supreme Court as 
vouchsafed by the Utah Constitution. Such a scenario mocks 
the provisions of Article V of the Utah Constitution which 
reads: 
The powers of the government of 
the State of Utah shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, the 
Legislature, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly be-
longing to one of these departments, 
shall exercise any functions apper-
taining to either of the others, except 
in the cases herein expressly directed 
or permitted. 
In this case the Board of Examiners, as an arm of 
the Executive branch of our state government, acted exactly 
as it should have done by withholding any action upon there-
spondent's claim until all parties had exhausted their 
- l 7-
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constitutionally protected right to have the issues determined 
1n the state's highest court. The Legislature would have been 
well advi~ed to follow the same constitutional pathway but 
chose not to do so in an arrogant disregard of this court's 
appellate powers under the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, 
Section 4. It has long been the law of this state that tho~e 
powers cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legislature. 
Robinson v. Durand, 36 U. 93, 104 P. 760. Having usurped the 
functions of this court by attempting to contravene the 
constitutionally protected rights of the appellant on behalf 
of the citizenry of this state to have this case reviewed in 
the Supreme Court, the Legislature has exceeded its powers 
and, therefore, it is incumbent upon this court to hear this 
appeal upon its merits and declare that portion of the 1979 
Supplemental Appropriations Act pertaining to the claim of the 
respondent to be an invalid exercise of legislative power. 
The foregoing argument is based on the initial 
vesting of jurisdiction in the lower court to adjudicate 
the respondent's claim as claimed by the respondent. Certainly 
if such jurisdiction never attached and the Board of Examiners 
had exclusive jurisdiction to consider and act upon the 
respondent's unliquidated claim, as set forth in POINT I 
of appellant's brief on appeal, then this appeal should be 
permitted to proceed in due course to establish that juris-
dictional right. 
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court. 
This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the lower 
Either it had jurisdiction or it did not. If it dtd 
the legislature should not be permitted to intervene after 
that jurisdiction has attached to deprive any party of tts 
constitutional right to appeal from an adverse judg•ent of 
the district court. If it did not, it is the constitutional 
prerogative of this court to so declare and not for the 
legislature to arrogate that judicial function to itself. 
The whole thrust of the respondent's argument is that it 
may invoke the jurisdiction of the courts part way and, 
after obtaining a generous district court judgment, preclude 
any appellate review of that judgment by running to a long 
friendly legislature for a most lucrative settlement of 
hotly contested legal issues against the opposition of the 
Board of Examiners. Such an abuse of the long-established 
concept of separation of powers in our state government simply 
should not be tolerated by this court. The faceless mass of 
this state's taxpayers deserve better treatment than the 
respondent, and the legislature, are willing to grant them. 
Dated this/..l/i day of August, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General of the State 
A fUtah fJ/.&.ca.·. K L. CRELLIN Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that ten copies of the foregoing 
reply bri~f were filed with the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah on the IJ;I day of August, 1979, and that two copies 
of said brief were served upon the respondent by depositing 
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed 
to Brant H. Wall, 500. Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, Attorney for respondent, on the~day of August, 
19 77. 
K L. RELLIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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